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I. Introduction
The review by Klenow and Malin (2010) of the microeconomic literature of price setting concludes
that goods are highly heterogeneous with respect to their degree of price stickiness. At one extreme
are goods that change prices every quarter or even once a month, including food, energy, and airfares;
and at the other extreme are services that change prices much less often than once a year.1 This
microeconomic evidence seems to be conﬁrmed by macroeconomic estimates. Bouakez et al. (2009), for
example, estimate a multi-sector New-Keynesian model for the U.S. and cannot reject the hypothesis
that some sectors–typically non-services–display ﬂexible prices. In contrast, they also ﬁnd that
services is by far the most price-rigid sector in the U.S. economy.
This evidence raises questions regarding the inﬂation measure that should be the target for mone-
tary policy, including interest rate rules. In particular, central bankers may wonder whether monetary
policy should respond to an inﬂation measure that puts some weight on inﬂation of ﬂexible-price goods
or, instead, respond to a measure mainly based on the inﬂation of sticky-price goods. In fact, monetary
policy discussions on the recent oil and food price shocks can be cast in these terms: should monetary
policy respond to a headline inﬂation that includes the inﬂation of energy and food (ﬂexible-price
goods)? or should it respond to a core inﬂation measure that excludes the inﬂation of these goods?2
In this paper, we provide answers to these questions by selecting the inﬂation measure of an interest
rate rule that is more prone to avert macroeconomic instability. By this we mean that the appropriate
inﬂation measure of the rule should (i) shield the economy against ﬂuctuations driven by self-fulﬁlling
expectations3–Keynes’ animal spirits–and (ii) ensure that even if agents are boundedly rational–in
the sense of adaptive learning as proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001)–they can still learn the
monetary policy targeted equilibrium so the economy will converge to it.4
Speciﬁcally, we develop a two-sector New-Keynesian DSGE model to study the determinacy and
learning stability (E-stability) properties of Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) for interest rate
rules responding to inﬂation measures that diﬀer in their degree of price stickiness.5 In the model, both
sectors feature nominal price rigidities but one of them–which we call the ﬂexible-price sector–faces
low rigidities in comparison with the other sector–which we refer to as the sticky-price sector. If the
aggregate inﬂation of the rule is expressed as a weighted average of the inﬂations of these two sectors,
then a myriad of inﬂation measures can be considered by varying, for instance, the weight on the
1Bils and Klenow (2004) ﬁnd, for instance, that about half of U.S. products display prices that last 4.3 months or less.
This includes energy related goods and raw products, for which prices change about 54 percent of the months considered.
Though more recent estimates of median price durations by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) are slightly higher, price stickiness heterogeneity appears to be undeniable.
2For a policy-maker discussion on the choice of price index see, for instance, Mishkin (2008) and Wynne (2008), among
others.
3Woodford (2003) and references therein discuss how interest rate rules may induce endogenous ﬂuctuations, in the
presence of real indeterminacy (multiple equilibria).
4See Bullard and Mitra (2002) for a discussion on how interest rate rules may induce fundamental-driven equilibria
that are not learnable.
5The concept of Expectational Stability (E-stability) for learning by Evans and Honkapoja (2001) is related to whether
a given REE is aymptotically stable, when agents form forecasts using recursive least square learning algorithms and
previous data from the economy.3
ﬂexible-price inﬂation. By allowing the central bank pick this weight, we see the inﬂation measure as
a policy variable, while focusing on rules that satisfy the Taylor principle; that is, active rules whereby
the response coeﬃcient to inﬂation is larger than one.
We ﬁnd that active rules responding to an inﬂation measure which puts some weight on the ﬂexible-
price inﬂation (a headline measure) are more prone to generate macroeconomic instability than rules
that exclusively respond to sticky-price inﬂation (a core measure). As a result, policy makers should
target the inﬂation measure of the truly sticky-price sectors.
Our conclusions follow from the analysis of several policy rule timings. We ﬁnd that forward-looking
rules that assign some positive weight to the expected ﬂexible-price inﬂation are more prone to induce
fundamental-driven equilibria that are not learnable and self-fulﬁlling expectations equilibria of the
“sunspot” type that are learnable. Backward-looking rules that put some weight on the past ﬂexible-
price inﬂation, on the other hand, can be also destabilizing, as they are more susceptible to generate
explosive equilibria for which economic ﬂuctuations are potentially unbounded. Only contemporaneous
rules appear to guarantee a unique and learnable equilibrium, for any inﬂation measure; that is, even
if the rule puts some weight on the current ﬂexible-price inﬂation. But across these diﬀerent timings,
the safe choice to rule out potential sources of instability is to respond exclusively to the sticky-price
inﬂation.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution of goods in agents’ preferences–in particular whether
the goods are Edgeworth substitutes, neutral or complements–plays a key role in our results. Such
elasticity determines the degree of comovement of the two sectoral inﬂation rates and, hence, aﬀects
the equilibrium response of the real interest rate to an adverse inﬂationary shock under diﬀerent
inﬂation measures. For instance, we show that equilibrium determinacy and learnability conditions
are generally more stringent under the assumption of complementarity; and we identify a threshold for
the weight on expected ﬂexible-price inﬂation beyond which any active rule responding to the headline
inﬂation always induces the non-learnability of the fundamental REE.
Our results hold under two diﬀerent cases regarding the heterogeneity of price setting. First,
we consider a strongly dichotomous economy with a fully ﬂexible-price sector–which faces no price
rigidities–and a sticky-price sector. This case allows us to derive analytical results and a straightfor-
ward intuition. In addition, this economy is analogous, on one hand, to the framework of Aoki (2001)
and subsequent work in closed economies on optimal policy;6 while, on the other hand, it resembles
the models in the extensive small open economy literature, such as Galí and Monacelli (2005), which
typically feature a sharp distinction between a fully ﬂexible-price traded good (or foreign good) and
a sticky-price non-traded good (or domestic good).7 The second case is a less heterogeneous economy
with two sticky-price sectors. We calibrate this economy to match roughly the micro evidence by Bils
and Klenow (2004) and assess the quantitative relevance of our theoretical results.
6For a discussion of the early contributions of this literature, some of which are based on the dichotomous assumption
of sticky prices and ﬂexible prices, see Canzoneri et al. (2003). For a recent application of models with this dichotomous
assumption to the analysis of the oil and food price shock, see Bodenstein et al. (2008) and Anand and Prasad (2010).
7See for instance Catao and Chang (2010), for a recent application of this framework to the analysis of large swings
in world food prices and their implications for monetary policy.4
Of particular interest is the result that by having some weight on the expected ﬂexible-price inﬂa-
tion, a rule may lead to a non-learnable fundamental-driven equilibrium. The intuition is straightfor-
ward in the dichotomous economy, where the expected ﬂexible-price inﬂation is negatively correlated
to current sticky-price output. As a result, a greater weight on ﬂexible-price inﬂation makes the rule
respond more negatively to current sticky-price output. This response, however, goes against the
policy prescriptions of “leaning against the wind” by Taylor (1999a)–nominal interest rates should
be adjusted positively, and more than one-for-one, in response to inﬂation, and positively to current
output. In the two-sector model, expected deviations of the sticky-price inﬂation from the REE may
be reinforced by a rule that responds positively to expected ﬂexible-price inﬂation, and therefore neg-
atively to current sticky-price output. This is because this rule may bring about a decrease in the
real interest rate which adds to sticky-price inﬂationary pressures, pushing the economy away from a
targeted equilibrium. So the equilibrium may become non-learnable.
Our work distinguishes itself from the New-Keynesian literature on interest rate rules and macro-
economic instability by focusing on the inﬂation measure as the potential source of instability. Ben-
habib et al. (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), Clarida et al. (2000), and Woodford (2003), among
others, discuss extensively how the rule’s degree of aggressiveness towards inﬂation (i.e., active versus
passive rules) and the timing of inﬂation (i.e., expected, contemporaneous or past inﬂation) may aﬀect
the extent to which rules induce endogenous ﬂuctuations driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations. Bullard
and Mitra (2002), Eusepi (2007), Evans and Honkapohja (2003), Evans and McGough (2005), Llosa
and Tuesta (2008), and Preston (2006), among others, investigate the importance of similar features
in the context of learning. But despite their seminal contributions, all these works do not consider the
measure of inﬂa t i o na sac e n t r a lb a n kp o l i c yc h o i c et h a tm a ya ﬀect both the learning and determinacy
of equilibrium.
Our work also distinguishes from Carlstrom et al. (2006a), which is an important exception in
the literature. By studying rules that respond to contemporaneous inﬂation, Carlstrom et al. (2006a)
claim that the measure of inﬂation is irrelevant to ensure equilibrium determinacy, as long as the
Taylor principle holds. Our work goes beyond theirs in two aspects. First, it tests the robustness
of their claim by analyzing forward-looking and backward-looking rules. Second, it adds learnability
as an extra criterion to select the inﬂation measure. Both aspects are crucial for revealing that, for
a degree of heterogeneous price stickiness consistent with micro data, the inﬂation measure seems to
be relevant for equilibrium determinacy and learnability. In this regard, our results suggest that the
Taylor principle does not necessarily apply either at the sectorial level or at the aggregate level.
Finally by using diﬀerent selection criteria, our work diﬀers from the optimal monetary policy liter-
ature that selects the measure of inﬂation based on welfare analysis. Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004) and
Mankiw and Reis (2003) recommend to target the inﬂation with the higher degree of price stickiness
from an optimal targeting rule perspective. Our work supports a similar conclusion from an instru-
mental rule perspective (Taylor rules) and under the diﬀerent criteria of equilibrium determinacy and
learnability. The recent works by Anand and Prasad (2010), Bodenstein et al. (2008), and Catao
and Chang (2010) study the implications of large swings in world food and oil price swings for the
inﬂation measure of instrumental rules. Here again the selection criteria is welfare-based, abstract-
ing from the fact that the inﬂation measure might exacerbate macroeconomic volatility by inducing5
non-fundamental-driven equilibria and unstable learning dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the general two-sector New-
Keynesian economy. Section III presents the main results by pursuing the equilibrium determinacy and
learnability analyses for forward-looking, contemporaneous, and backward-looking rules that respond
to diﬀerent measures of inﬂation. Section IV tests and discusses the robustness of our results under
some extensions of our framework, including an explicit response to output in the rule and a diﬀerent
timing of real money balances in utility. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. The Model
In this section we develop a New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a
closed economy with two goods.8 The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitively-lived
household-ﬁrm units, each of whom derives utility from consuming, not working, and the liquidity
services of money.9 The unit consumes two types of composite goods–which we call  and  and
a r em a d eo fac o n t i n u u mo fi n t e r m e d i a t ed i ﬀerentiated products, indexed by  ∈ [01] The unit also
produces the -th variety of the composite good  (from now on, good  of type )a n dt h e-th
variety of the composite good  (from now on, good  of type ) That is, each production unit is
split in two sub-units, specializing in a type- and type- good, respectively. We will often refer to
these two sub-units as sector  and sector .
A. The Household-Firm Unit

































where E0 denotes the (potentially) subjective expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time 0,  is aggregate consumption, 
 (
 ) denotes the labor eﬀort supplied to produce
good  (), and  = 
 are the real money balances in terms of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
 to be deﬁned below. In addition,  ∈ (01) is the subjective discount factor, 0 is the constant
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, and  corresponds to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the labor
supplied to sector  for  = .10
8To be more realistic, one should consider a more general -goods economy, for  arbitrarily large However, this
would just enlarge the set of policy options (namely, the inﬂation measure to include in the policy rule) available to the
policy-maker, without adding any further insight to the focus of our discussion. Hence, without loss of generality, we let
 =2 
9Our results would equally hold in a model with separate consumption and production decisions, with ﬁrms operating
in two distinct productive sectors.
10From the point of view of the household, the labor supplied to diﬀerent sectors are not perfect substitutes, as in
Woodford (2003). Clearly, this speciﬁcation nests the RBC indivisible labour case, which occurs for 
 = 
 =0 .6






















where  is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods, while  is a parameter associated
with the share of good  in aggregate consumption.11
In this set-up, good  and good  can be Edgeworth complements, neutral, or substitutes, de-
pending on the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution 1
 and . To see this, deﬁne
the utility of aggregate consumption as  =
1−

1− . T h e nb y( 2 )t h es i g no f 2
 is determined by
the sign of 1
 − Therefore, the goods are complements when 1
, neutral if  = 1
 and substitutes
when 1



































The relative price  is deﬁned as 
 












−1 denotes the “gross” inﬂation for good  = 




































with   1 (respectively   1) denoting the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between any
pair of goods of 
 (respectively 
 ). The relative demands of the good  of type  and the good  of

































 )+() and the following: a) ()() () and () are continuous and twice diﬀerentiable;




 0   0) and strictly concave (  0   0), and  = 
 −

  0 and  −()









and concave ( ≤ 0  ≤ 0); and d) () is strictly increasing (  0) and strictly concave (  0) Details can
be provided from the authors upon request.7
for any  ∈ [01]















 denoting the labor hired. Both productions occur in a regime of monopolistic compe-
tition. We assume labor to be perfectly mobile within each sector, implying that the nominal wages are






 for any  ∈ [01] However, labor is completely
immobile across sectors and, therefore, 
 and 
 can diﬀer in equilibrium.12 The economy-wide
aggregate technology shock  is the only source of fundamental intrinsic uncertainty and behaves as:13
ˆ  = ˆ −1 +  (6)
where ˆ  =l n ( )∈ (01) and  ∼ (0 2).




 of the variety  of both intermediate goods it





















 denote the economy-wide demand levels for the composite goods  and . Hence, output























for any  ∈ [01] (7)
We introduce nominal price rigidities as in Rotemberg (1982). When setting the price of a good 














 for  = ,
with the adjustment cost coeﬃcient  measuring the degree of nominal rigidity in sector  : the higher
 the larger the degree of price stickiness in that sector. The diﬀerence between  and  will
capture the diﬀerent degree of price stickiness across sectors. Without loss of generality, we assume
that    i.e., in sector  prices are always relatively more ﬂexible, but not necessarily completely
ﬂexible, than in sector  But note that our set-up embeds the case of fully ﬂexible prices and perfect
competition in sector  by setting  =0and  → +∞.
Besides money , the household-ﬁrm unit has access to a government bond , which pays
a nominal interest rate  − 1 The unit also pays taxes 

 and receives labor subsidies from the
12This assumption is quite common in the related literature (see Carlstrom et al., 2006a,b, Carvalho, 2006, Bouakez
et al., 2009, Catao and Chang, 2010). It can be motivated by the existence of agent-speciﬁcs k i l l s ,ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs,
costs of learning new jobs, or any other real friction that makes job reallocation costly. Results for the case of perfect
labor mobility are available from the authors upon request.
13Since we will be focusing on equilibrium determinacy and E-stability the assumption of an aggregate technology
shock rather than two sector-speciﬁc shocks is without loss of generality. It simpliﬁes the notation without aﬀecting the
results of the paper.8
government at the rates  and .14 The budget constraint can then be written as follows:
 +  +  + 
































































where the right-hand side represents the sources of the unit’s wealth, including interest payments on
government bonds, money holdings, labor wage income, and net proﬁts from the production of both
goods. This wealth is used to ﬁnance new money holdings, purchase government bonds, and pay for
total consumption and taxes, as described by the left-hand side of the constraint.













   }∞
=0 in order to maximize (1) subject to (7), (8) and a standard Non-Ponzi







































































































⎦ for  = 




 is the nominal marginal cost of
producing good  of type 
The interpretation of these equations is straightforward. Condition (9) is the standard Euler
equation for consumption  Equation (10) makes the marginal rate of substitution between labor
allocated to the production of the type  good and consumption equal to the respective real subsidized
wage. Equation (11) is the optimal price setting condition for a unit producing good  of type  It
simply states that, in every period, the unit sets a new price 

 taking into account its impact on
current proﬁts, as reﬂected by the terms on the left-hand side of (11), and the impact on future proﬁts,
as captured by the term on the right-hand side of the same equation.
14The introduction of constant subsidies 
 and 
 simpliﬁes the steady-state analysis and allows us to derive analytical
results. See the Appendix C..9
While the ﬁrst order conditions (9)-(11) together with the appropriate transversality condition are
necessary and suﬃcient if E is assumed to be the expectations operator conditional on all available
information (hence, rational), the same might not apply for more general settings. In this paper,
learning takes the form of the “Euler Equation” approach by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), which
remains the most common in the adaptive learning literature related to our work. More speciﬁcally,
it is assumed that economic agents are boundedly-rational and choose based on the ﬁrst order condi-
tions (9)-(11), which describe the relevant marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs associated with each
economic decision.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the monopolistic units belonging to the same sector






 for any  ∈ [01] Given that they face the
same wage rates 
 and 







 for any  ∈ [01] Combining the ﬁrst order conditions of this maximization






















 − ¯ ¢2 
 ) we obtain
the New-Keynesian Phillips curves (NKPC):
(













































The government issues two nominal liabilities (money and a domestic bond), provides labor income
subsidies pays interest on its debt and receives revenues from seigniorage and lump-sum taxes It
follows a generic Ricardian ﬁscal policy, by setting taxes in order to satisfy its intertemporal budget
constraint and a Non-Ponzi game condition.
Following Taylor (1993), we deﬁne monetary policy as an interest rate feedback rule. The govern-
ment sets the gross nominal interest rate  as an increasing and continuous function of the deviation
of a chosen measure of inﬂation 
 with respect to a target ¯ .F o r m a l l y ,








where  = −101   1 (13)
¯  i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t et a r g e ta n dE is the expectation operator. For simplicity, we also assume that
the targets ¯  and ¯  correspond to the steady-state levels of 
 and .
Some remarks are in order regarding the speciﬁcation in (13). First, we focus on rules that
satisfy the Taylor principle, also known as active rules. These are rules that respond to increases in
inﬂation with a more than one-for-one increase in the interest rate, i.e.,   1. And second, we
allow for diﬀerent policy rule timings, including a forward-looking rule that responds to the deviation






; a contemporaneous rule that reacts to10














To underscore the role of the inﬂation measure of the rule as a policy variable, we deﬁne the
inﬂation measure in the rule (13) as:

 = 
 +( 1− )
  (14)
where in principle the government can freely pick the weight  This set-up is general enough to nest
the cases of a rule responding to the most ﬂexible-price inﬂation only ( =1 ), the stickiest price
(core) inﬂation ( =0 ), or any arbitrary measure of headline inﬂation ( ∈ (01)), including the CPI
inﬂation case of  = .
III. Equilibrium Determinacy and Stability under Learning
Given   1 the objective of our analysis is to assess under what conditions on the policy para-
meter  the economy displays a determinate (unique) and expectationally stable (E-stable) Rational
Expectations Equilibrium (REE). Both equilibrium determinacy and E-stability are particularly desir-
able from the point of view of the policymaker. Under determinacy, the equilibrium dynamics are solely
driven by fundamentals, ruling out the eﬀects of extrinsic uncertainty such as noise, market sentiment
and all other factors often referred to as “sunspots.” Under E-stability, even if boundedly rational,
economic agents will eventually learn the fundamental REE by recursive least squares regressions on
past data, and the economy will converge to the targeted equilibrium.
To derive our main results we consider two diﬀerent price-setting cases embedded in our previously
discussed set-up. First, we study an economy with the strong dichotomy of a fully ﬂexible-price sector
and a sticky-price sector. This case allows us to derive analytical results and, as mentioned in the
Introduction, reﬂects the popular two-sector price setting assumption in both the optimal monetary
policy literature in closed economies and the small open economy literature. Furthermore, we believe
this case captures the essential message of the micro and macro evidence, namely: goods diﬀer greatly
in how frequently their prices change with some of them changing prices every quarter or more often.
From a modeling perspective, this implies a non-zero measure of fully ﬂexible-price sectors, especially if
the model is calibrated to match quarterly data. The second case attempts to take the micro evidence
more seriously and therefore calibrates the main set-up, with price-stickiness in both sectors, to the
evidence provided by Bils and Klenow (2004). This helps us show that our main analytical results hold
(numerically) for a general two-sector economy with a lower, but still realistic, degree of heterogeneous
price stickiness across sectors.
A. The Methodology
We now provide a brief description of our methodology for the equilibrium determinacy and learning
analyses. We derive, in particular, the E-stability conditions that a representation of an equilibrium11
needs to satisfy in order to be learnable.
The characterization of a Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) follows Blanchard and Kahn
(1980). For each of the aforementioned rules we log-linearize and write the model as
b +1 = b  + Λb  (15)
where  is now the rational expectations operator, b  is a  × 1 vector of endogenous variables, b 
is the technology shock, and  and Λ are conformable matrices. The characterization depends on
the number of roots of  that lie outside the unit circle: if this number is equal to the number of
non-predetermined variables, there is a unique equilibrium (determinacy); when this number is less
than the number of non-predetermined variables, then there are multiple equilibria (indeterminacy);
and if this number of roots is greater than the number of non-predetermined variables, then almost
surely there exists no non-explosive solution to the model.
The learning analysis draws on Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Agents no longer are endowed
with rational expectations but, instead, have adaptive rules to form expectations using recursive least
squares updating. We focus, in particular, on E-stab i l i t ya sal e a r n i n gc r i t e rion: a representation
of an equilibrium is learnable if it is E-stable. The reason is that under E-stability, recursive least-
squares learning is in general locally convergent to the REE. This is shown analytically by Marcet and
Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for models with a unique equilibrium and, through
simulations, by Evans and McGough (2005) for a New-Keynesian model that displays “sunspot”
equilibria.
We proceed to derive the conditions under which a REE is E-stable. To do so, we reduce the model
associated with each of the interest rate rules to:
b  = Υ + ΩEb +1 + Γb −1 + Πb  and b  = b −1 +  (16)
where b  is a  × 1 vector of endogenous variables, b  is the exogenous fundamental shock.  ∈ (01)
and  v (0 2). In addition, Υ, Ω Γ and Π are conformable matrices of constants, while E
denotes in general (non-rational) expectations.
Consider ﬁrst the E-stability conditions for a fundamental-driven REE. In this case we focus on
the learnability of McCallum’s (1983) Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution. Therefore we assume
agents follow a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) b  = A + Fb −1 + Nb  where A F and N are
conformable matrices. Iterating forward the PLM and using it to eliminate all the forecasts in the
model, we obtain the implied Actual Law of Motion (ALM) b  = B[Υ + ΩA + Γb −1 +( ΩN + Π)b ]
with B =( −ΩF)−1 The PLM and ALM, in turn, deﬁne the T-mapping (AFN)=( AFN)
where A = B(Υ+ΩA)F = BΓ and N = B(ΩN +Π)15 The ﬁxed points of this mapping are
15A fundamental part in the learnability analysis consists of making explicit what agents know when they form their
forecasts. In the E-stability analysis literature, it is common to assume that when agents form their expectations E 
they do not know   This may be, however, inconsistent with the assumptions that we used to derive the ﬁrst order




  Therefore to be
consistent, in the analysis to follow we assume that when forming expectations E  agents know  12
the REE. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we say that the MSV representation of a REE is
E-stable if all the eigenvalues of the matrices of the derivatives
A =( −ΩF)−1Ω  F =
£
( − ΩF)−1Γ
¤0⊗[(−ΩF)−1Ω] and N = ⊗[(−ΩF)−1Ω] (17)
evaluated at the REE ﬁxed point, have real parts less than one. On the contrary, the MSV solution
is not E-stable if any of the eigenvalues has a real part larger than one.
To derive the E-stability conditions for stationary “sunspot” equilibria, we concentrate on Com-
mon Factor (CF) representations, as in Evans and McGough (2005). When b  is a vector of non-
predetermined variables, the PLM for the CF representation corresponds to b  = A + Nb  + G
where A N,a n dG are conformable vectors.  in turn, is a “sunspot” following  = −1 + 
where ||  1 and  is an arbitrary martingale diﬀerence sequence. Then T-mapping associated with
this PLM corresponds to (AN,G)=( ANG),w h e r eA =( Υ+ΩA) N =( ΩN +Π) and
G = ΩG Using this mapping, the E-stability conditions can be stated as having all the eigenvalues
of the matrices
A = Ω  N =  ⊗ Ω and G =  ⊗ Ω (18)
with real parts less than one.
B. The Strong Dichotomy: A Flexible-Price and Sticky-Price Economy
This section provides the results of the case in which sector  features perfect competition
( → +∞)a n df u l l yﬂexible prices ( =0 ), while sector  keeps the standard New-Keynesian
characteristics.16 For reasons of space, we present analytical results only for forward-looking rules.
That is, for  =1in equation (13). Our interest for rules responding to expectations is motivated by
the empirical estimates in Clarida et al. (2000), and more recently in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Boivin (2006).17
Since  =0and  → +∞ then equation (12) for  =  reduces to 
 =1  The rest of
the equations of our set-up still hold. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where the
steady-state relative price  is equal to one, and hence where  =  = 18 We then proceed by
log-linearizing the equations of the model around the steady state of the economy. Log-linearized
16The assumption of perfect competition helps us simplify the notation. Our results would equally hold for any ﬁnite
value 

17Analytical results for the case of a contemporaneous interest rate rule, as well as numerical results for the case of a
backward-looking interest rate rule are available from the authors upon request.
18This is not unusual in the analysis of two-sector models. See for instance Galí and Monacelli (2005). As shown
in the Appendix A, the introduction of labor subsidies allows us to focus on the steady state where  =1 , simplifying





















 = ¯  ¯ 
 =¯ 
 and ¯ 
 =¯ 
 = ¯ 13
variables will be denoted with a hat. For instance, log-linearized sticky-price consumption will be
denoted as b 
  where b 






and ¯  corresponds to its steady-state level.
Under a forward-looking rule, log-linearizing (13) and (14) yields:




+1 = b 
+1 +( 1− )b 
+1 (20)
On the demand side, by combining the (log-linearized) expressions for (5), the CES speciﬁcation in
(2), the CPI (3), equation (10), 
 =1  the deﬁnition of the relative price ,a n dt h em a r k e tc l e a r i n g
condition 
 = 
  we obtain the following relationship between the ﬂexible-price and sticky-price
consumptions:
b 
 = b 
 + κ1b  (21)
where  ≡
(1−)(1−)
(+)+1− and κ1 ≡ (1+)
(+)+1− Note that ()=(1 − ) Hence, along
any equilibrium path, the two consumptions are positively (negatively) related when the goods are
Edgeworth complements (substitutes) i.e. 1
 (1
). When the goods are neutral ( = 1
 hence
 =0 ), ﬂexible-price consumption depends only on the aggregate technology shock.
Combining the log-linearized versions of the demand functions in (4) with (5) and (21), we ﬁnd
that:
b 












(b  − b −1) (22)
where  ≡
+
(+)+1−  0 This equation captures, in part, the expenditure switching or substitution
eﬀect that will be crucial to understand our results: for a given sticky-price inﬂation, the growth rate
of sticky-price consumption is positively related to ﬂexible-price inﬂation.
The demand side characterization is completed by log-linearizing the Euler equation (9) to obtain:
b  = Eb +1 −
1

(b  − Eb +1) (23)
with the (log) CPI inﬂation given by
b +1 = b 
+1 +( 1− )b 
+1 (24)
Using this and the log-linearized versions of (2) and (3), with equations (21) and (22) allows us to
derive a log-linearized Euler equation for sticky-price consumption:
b 
 − Eb 
+1 = −
³
b  − Eb 
+1
´
− κ2b  (25)
with  ≡ [( +1− )+]







The supply side, on the other hand, is described by the log-linearized version of the NKPC (12):
b 
 = Eb 
+1 + c 

  (26)14
with  ≡ (−1)
()
2  0 which relates the current inﬂation of the sticky-price good b 
 to the inﬂation
expectations Eb 
+1 and the marginal cost of producing this good c 

 . Furthermore, by combining







 − ¯ 
¢2 
 with equations
(5) and (21), we can express the real marginal costs in terms of log-linearized sticky-price consumption:
c 

 = b 
 + hb  (27)
where  ≡  + 1








 Replacing this into (26) yields:
b 
 = Eb 
+1 + b 
 + sb  (28)
where  ≡   0 and s ≡ h  0 which clearly shows that, in the model, an excess of demand for
the sticky-price good is translated into sticky-price inﬂationary pressures.
Based on this log-linearized set of equations, we can provide the following deﬁnition of a fundamental-
driven equilibrium in this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the stochastic process {b }
∞
=0  an equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes {b 
b 
 b 
  b 
  b 
 }∞
=0 satisfying a) the rule (19); b) the deﬁnition of full inﬂation (20); c) equation (22);
d) the Euler equation for sticky-price consumption (25); and e) the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
(28).19
Some Analytical Results. Proposition 1 provides the results for the equilibrium determinacy
analysis. It states that conditions under which an active forward-looking rule delivers a locally unique
REE crucially depend on the weight of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation  in the inﬂation measure b 
,a n d
the types of goods considered (complements, neutral, or substitutes). It reveals that across these
types, as the weight on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation increases, the rule is more prone to induce multiple
equilibria, even if the Taylor Principle holds (i.e.,   1).
Proposition 1 Let 1() ≡
+2(1+)
+2(1+)  0 and ∗ = 1
 where  ≡  Consider the forward-looking
interest rate in (19)-(20) with   1 and assume that agents have Rational Expectations, i.e., E = 
a) For any  ∈ (01) when  ≥ 1
 (substitutes or neutral), or any  ∈ (0∗) when 1
 (comple-
ments), the following hold: 1) there exists a unique local REE if 1    1() and 2) there exist
multiple local REE if   1()
b) For any  ∈ (∗1) when 1
 (complements) there exist multiple local REE for any   1
Proof. See the Appendix B.
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=0 we can pin down the rest of the










The existence of multiple equilibria allows for the presence of stationary “sunspot” equilibria. This,
in turn, raises the question of whether there are representations of these equilibria that are learnable.
If this were the case, then economic agents would be more likely to coordinate their actions and push
the economy towards these equilibria driven by “sunspots.” The following proposition shows that, in
fact, there are learnable Common Factor (CF) representations, whose learnability clearly depends on
the weight of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation  in the headline inﬂation b 
.
Proposition 2 Let 1() ≡
+2(1+)
+2(1+)  0 2() ≡ 1
  0 and ∗ = 1
 Consider the forward-
looking rule in (19)-(20) with   1 For any  ∈ (01) when 1
 ≤  (substitutes or neutral), or any
 ∈ (0∗) when 1
 (complements), the CF representation of stationary “sunspot” equilibria is
learnable in the E-stability sense if 1()    2()
Proof. See the Appendix B.
But even if one focuses on fundamental-driven equilibria, ignoring the multiple REE problem,
the weight on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation  a n dt h et y p e so fg o o d sp l a yk e yr o l e sf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo f
unstable learning dynamics. The next proposition presents the results for the learnability of the MSV
representation of fundamental-driven equilibria (from now on MSV-REE). It shows that, given the
response coeﬃcient , putting higher weights  makes a rule more prone to induce fundamental-driven
equilibria that are not learnable in the E-stability sense.20
Proposition 3 Let 2() ≡ 1
  0 and ∗ = 1
 Consider the forward-looking interest rate rule in
(19)-(20) with   1 and concentrate on fundamental equilibria.
a) For any  ∈ (01) when  ≥ 1
 (substitutes or neutral), or any  ∈ (0∗) when 1
 (comple-
ments), the MSV-REE is 1) learnable in the E-stability sense if 1    2() and 2) not learnable
in the E-stability sense if   2()
b) For any  ∈ (∗1) when 1
 (complements), the MSV-REE is not learnable in the E-stability
sense for any   1 .
Proof. See the Appendix B.
Figure 1 puts together the results from Propositions 1, 2, and 3. It plots, for each type of goods, the
combinations of policy parameters  and  that deliver equilibrium determinacy or indeterminacy.
It also shows the combinations for E-stable (learnable) or E-unstable (non-learnable) MSV-REE, as
well as the combinations for E-stable CF representations of “sunspot” equilibria.
20The importance of learnability for the MSV solution is discussed in the recent debate on the meaningfulness of policy
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Figure 1: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for forward-looking rules, when varying
the response coeﬃcient to inﬂation  and the weight on expected ﬂexible-price inﬂation  in the
headline inﬂation.17
In this ﬁgure, the one-sector New-Keynesian model analyzed in Bullard and Mitra (2002) corre-
sponds to the vertical axis, where  =0  meaning that the rule responds solely to expected sticky-price
inﬂation. In this case, and regardless of the goods type, equilibrium determinacy requires the active
rule to satisfy an upper threshold 0
 ≡ 1+
2(1+)
 ,s ot h a t  0
 According to Bullard and Mitra,
this threshold takes very high values for realistic calibrations and, therefore, is non-binding for policy
design. E-stability of the MSV solution, on the other hand, is ensured by any active rule (  1).
Some interesting results emerge for positive weights on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation (0), since
the determinacy and E-stability bounds, 1() and 2() are decreasing in this weight.
First, across diﬀerent types of goods, putting more weight on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation shrinks
the range 1    1() under which a rule delivers a unique and learnable equilibrium. When
  1() the rule induces multiple equilibria and, from the learning perspective, gives rise to the
following instability problems. If 1()    2(), then the rule induces “sunspot” equilibria
with learnable CF representations. While if   2() then the rule leads to fundamental equilibria
with non-learnable MSV representations. This contrasts starkly with Bullard and Mitra’s results for
active forward-looking rules, which suggest that the funtamental MSV solution is always learnable,
even under multiple equilibria.
Second, the determinacy conditions are generally more stringent that those related to the E-
stability of the MSV solution. That is, for any  ∈ (01) when  ≥ 1
,a n df o ra n y ∈ (0∗) when
1
,w eh a v et h a t2()  1(), and therefore determinacy implies E-stability, but not viceversa.
Third, the lower the elasticity of substitution across goods, the more stringent the determinacy and
E-stability conditions. In fact, simple algebra shows that, for any  ∈ (01) when  ≥ 1
 (substitute
or neutral goods), and for any  ∈ (0∗) when 1
 (complement goods) both frontiers 1() and
2() are increasing in the elasticity 
And fourth, for complement goods, increasing  can be even more harmful. For these goods there
is a threshold ∗ beyond which any active rule leads to multiple equilibria and makes the MSV solution
non-learnable.21
Some Intuition. We provide a simple intuition for our results in the context of complement goods,
although a similar intuition can be derived for substitute or neutral goods. We analyze the adaptive
learning process of economic agents following an initial deviation from the fundamental REE. Under
adaptive learning, agents make forecasts using recursive least squares estimations on available data.
Though we assume that they have the right functional form of the MSV solution, they might still
overestimate or underestimate the impact of the technology shock on inﬂation and output. Then we
explain how this initial deviation can be reinforced or oﬀset by the policy rule.
21In the limiting case of  =1  when the rule responds solely to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, it can be proved that the
range of  for which there is a unique and learnable equilibrium is non-empty, only for substitute goods. For neutral
and complement goods, the equilibrium is always indeterminate and the MSV solution is E-unstable for any   1 The
proof of this result relies on a continuity argument for  following the lines of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3.18
Key to develop our intuition is the following expression for the real interest rate:







+1 with  ≡  (29)
which is derived from the rule and equations (22) and (25). Under complement goods 1,a ss h o w n
by Lemma 1 in the Appendix B.
Assume that boundely-rational agents expect sticky-price inﬂation to be higher than in the REE. If




 then by (29) the real interest rate declines (with respect to the REE)
for any   1 This stimulates sticky-price consumption, by (25), which in turn induces higher sticky-
price inﬂation, by (28). Over time, this mechanism leads to upward revisions of both the expected
sticky-price inﬂation and consumption. As a result, the rule does not correct the initial deviation from
the REE and, instead, moves the economy further away from it. This unstable dynamics is not ruled





and adopts an overly aggressive response to inﬂation,   1
.





but 1    1
 the initial deviation from the REE induces
an increase in the real interest rate, thus slowing down consumption and putting downward pressure
on sticky-price inﬂation. Agents would then correct downward their initial higher inﬂation forecast,
which would move sticky-price consumption and the related inﬂation closer to the REE. By this
self-correcting mechanism, agents will (eventually) make the economy converge to the fundamental
REE.
Similarly, we could also construct a sunspot-driven equilibrium. However, in this case, the initial
deviation from the fundamental REE would not be due to the agents’ bounded rationality, but to
the presence of non-fundamental belief shocks. Only under the conditions spelled in part a1) of
Proposition 1, such initial deviation would not be self-fulﬁlled and agents would gradually revert to
the fundamental REE.
To complement this intuition, we link our results to those policy recommendations in Bullard and
Mitra (2002) and Taylor (1999a). They advocate for “leaning against the wind” policies: nominal
interest rates should be adjusted positively, and more than one-for-one, in response to inﬂation, and
positively to current output. In our model, a rule that puts some positive weight on expected ﬂexible-
price inﬂation (0) is actually equivalent to a rule that reacts negatively to current sticky-price
output b 
 . To see this, note that from equation (22) and b 
 = b 
 the rule (19) can be written as:




+1 − b 

¢
with  ≡  Then, for given  and  increasing the weight
 is equivalent to responding more aggressively to current sticky-price output b 
 , but in an e g a t i v e
way. Clearly this negative response goes against the “leaning against the wind” policies. As a result,
this response may bring about a decrease in the real interest rate, reinforcing potential sticky-price
inﬂationary pressures and pushing the economy away from a targeted equilibrium.
C. The General Set-up: The Bils-Klenow Calibration
We focus now in the two-sector model with price rigidities in both sectors. From the log-linearization
of the CPI index (3), the relative demands in (4), the relative price equation (5), the Euler Equation19
(9), the intratemporal conditions in (10) for  =  the New-Keynesian Phillips curves in (12) for






for  =  and the
market clearing conditions, we obtain the following system:




b  − Eb 




b  = b 
 +( 1− )b 
 (31)
b 
 = Eb 
+1 +  ¡
 + 
¢
b  −  ¡
1+¢




 = Eb 
+1 +  ¡
 + 
¢
b  +  ¡
1+¢
b  −  ¡
1+¢
b  (33)
b  = b −1 + b 
 − b 
  (34)
and
b  = Eb 
+ + (1 − )Eb 
+
where b  follows (6) and  =
−1
()2 for  = . The system consists, respectively, of an aggregate
Euler equation, the deﬁnition of CPI inﬂation, two New-Keynesian Phillips curves, the law of motion
of the relative price, and the interest rate rule.
As analytical results are no longer attainable, we resort to the numerical analysis of a calibrated
version of our economy. Most of our parameters are set in accordance to the existing literature. The
parameter  in (1) is picked such that in steady-state the household-ﬁrm unit allocates one third of
its time to work. We assume equal steady-state gross inﬂation across sectors ( =  = )a n ds e t
the annual inﬂation equal to 3 percent. We pick  =  =8 , implying a steady state gross mark-up
of 15% in both sectors, while  =1  i.e., a log-utility. Given , the cases of complement, susbtitute
and neutral goods are captured by setting  equal to 05, 15,a n d1, respectively. The remaining
structural parameters are given the following values:  =0 99=0 78 and  =  =2(a Frisch
elasticity of labor supplied in both sectors equal to 0.5).22
22The assumptions of equal steady-state mark-ups and Frisch elasticities across sectors are not driving factors. We have




 and found only mild quantitative
changes in our results. More details are available from the authors upon request.20
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
         ¯ 
09 910 41 9 2 2 8 8 0 67 74 10074 078
The key aspect of our calibration are the price adjustment cost coeﬃcients  and  We calibrate
them using three key facts from the micro-evidence on price setting by Bils and Klenow (2004): the
share of ﬁrms with an expected price duration of at most one quarter, i.e., the more ﬂexible-price side
of the economy; the average quarterly frequency of price change; and the average expected quarterly
duration of price rigidity.23 As extensively described in the Appendix C, we obtain  =0 4  =0 67
and  =7 4 . That is, our calibrated economy features a signiﬁcant degree of sticky-price heterogeneity
across the two sectors, with sector  featuring very low adjustment costs to price changes. Since prices
in sector  are almost ﬂexible, although not fully ﬂexible, in the analysis to follow in this section we
refer to the inﬂation of this sector as the ﬂexible-price inﬂation. Table 1 summarizes our benchmark
calibration.
C.1. Forward-Looking Rules
Figure 2 shows that, under a forward-looking rule, the determinacy and E-stability results for a
realistic calibration of the two-sticky-price-sector economy are qualitatively similar to the analytical
results of the “strong dichotomy” case in Subsection B (see Figure 1). Across diﬀerent types of
goods, putting a higher weight on the the ﬂexible-price inﬂation restricts the set of forward-looking
rules that induce a unique and learnable fundamental REE. Moreover, there exist combinations of 
and  for which the economy displays learnable “sunspot” equilibria. In addition, when goods are
complements, any active rule induces non-learnable fundamental-driven equilibria, if the weight  is
above a threshold ∗ With the strong dichotomy being a limiting case of the more general set-up and
given the signiﬁcant degree of sticky-price heterogeneity resulting from our calibration, the intuition
provided above for the results should be unaltered.
To give a sense of the quantitative importance of our results, Table 2 quantiﬁes the determinacy
and E-stability thresholds for the case of Edgeworth complementarity.
In row a) we consider an active rule with a response to inﬂation  =2  which is the lower bound
to the estimate of the “degree of activism” in the post-Volcker period by Cogley and Sargent (2005).
We ﬁnd that multiple equilibria arise for 044 while the fundamental MSV-REE ceases to be
learnable for 048 This says that, even if the Taylor principle of   1 holds, endogenous
23We refer to the Bils and Klenow (2004) evidence rather than to others, such as Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) or
Klenow and Kryvtov (2008), mainly because the data is readily available from their paper. Nevertheless, we are aware
that, because of the inclusions of sales and forced substitutions, their reported statistics are somewhat upward-biased
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Figure 2: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for forward-looking rules. Parameters
other than  and  are set at baseline values shown in Table 1.
Note: ME = Multiple Equilibria, ES-CF = E-Stable Common Factor representation of a “sunspot”
equilibrium, and MSV = Minimum State Variable representation of a fundamental equilibrium.22
aggregate instability occurs for a weight on sector  inﬂation just slightly above the CPI weight of
 =0 4.
Row b) looks at the consequences of a positive  from another angle. We ﬁxi t sv a l u eb e l o w
∗ =0 92 For instance, we set  =  and identify the determinacy/E-stability bounds with respect
to . We obtain multiple equilibria for   218 and a non-learnable MSV-REE for   23.B u t
for 092 no active rule is stabilizing.
Table 2: Forward-Looking Rules
Determinacy and E-stability Bounds for Complement Goods
Determinacy Learning
UE ME ES-MSV ES-CF Sunspot EU-MSV
a) =2 0 ≤ 044 044 ≤ 1 0 ≤ 048 044 048 048 ≤ 1
b)  =  =0 4 1   218 218   1   23 218   23 23  
Note: ∗=0 92 UE = Unique equilibrim. ME = Multiple Equilibria.
ES-MSV = E-stable (learnable) MSV representation of a fundamental equilibrium.
ES-CF Sunspot = E-stable (learnable) CF representation of a “sunspot” equilibrium.
EU-MSV = E-unstable (non-learnable) MSV representation of a fundamental equilibrium.
C.2. Other Timings for the Policy Rule
Figure 3 displays the results for the case of the contemporaneous rule b  = b 
 In this case,
and regardless of the types of goods (complements, substitutes, or neutral), the measure of inﬂation
does not aﬀect both equilibrium determinacy and E-stability. As long as the rule satisﬁes the Taylor
principle of   1 there is a unique and learnable equilibrium. This result is reminiscent of that by
Carlstrom et al. (2006a), although they exclusively focus on determinacy, while here we complement
their analysis by showing the learnability of the MSV representation.24
Ad i ﬀerent type of instability occurs under the backward-looking rule b  = b 
−1 Responding
to past ﬂexible-price inﬂation can induce explosive equilibria, that is, the economy diverges from
the steady state equilibrium and give rise to unbounded ﬂuctuations. Figure 4 shows that raising 
makes the backward-looking rule more prone to induce these equilibria, in particular for the case of
Edgeworth complementarity. However, when the equilibrium is determinate, it is also learnable.25
24We ﬁnd that this (numerical) result holds under any calibration considered. It can also be proved analytically for
the dichotomous economy of Section B. There,   =  












 is then equivalent to a positive response to sticky-price output growth, which is beneﬁcial to determinacy.
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 Contemporaneous Rules
Figure 3: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for contemporaneous rules. Parameters
other than  and  are set at baseline values shown in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for backward-looking rules. Parameters
other than  and  are set at baseline values shown in Table 1.
Note: MSV = Minimum State Variable representation of a fundamental equilibrium.25
These results for other timings for the policy rule together with the results for forward-lookig
rules suggest an important policy lesson to rule out potential sources of instability: to be on the safe
side, policy makers should consider targeting the inﬂation of the sectors with a higher degree of price
stickiness.
C.3. Quantitative Sensitivity
We conclude this Section by investigating the quantitative eﬀect of varying the price stickiness
heterogeneity across sectors as well as the share  of ﬂexible-price goods. Varying  allows us to study
the eﬀects of responding to CPI inﬂation.
Aggregate Price Stickiness and Its Heterogeneity The variety of empirical estimates from
the micro-based studies motivates us to assess how equilibrium determinacy and E-stability depend
on diﬀerent degrees of aggregate price rigidity and its heterogeneity across sectors. We focus on the
average frequency of price change –a measure of aggregate price rigidity–and the relative standard
deviation (also known as, the coeﬃcient of variation) of the sectoral frequencies  and ,w h i c hw e
take as a measure of the degree of heterogeneity and denote by ∆ ∈ (01). More formally, we deﬁne
 =  +( 1− ) and ∆ =
q
( − )




Concentrating on the frequencies of price change ( for  = ) rather than an average adjustment
costs ( for  = ), is motivated by the fact that the available empirical evidence is about the
frequency and not the cost of price changes. Clearly, this choice does not aﬀect the interpretation of
the results. There is a one to one mapping between these measures, as explained in the Appendix C.
Ah i g h e r implies a lower 
In this assessment, we consider  ∈ [0208] which includes the value  =0 52 used in our
benchmark “Bils-Klenow” calibration. Then, for each possible pair (∆) we set  and  such
that they satisfy the equations in (35). Once  and  are identiﬁed, we compute the corresponding
adjustment cost parameters  and  following the same calibration procedure explained in the
Appendix C. We consider a forward-looking rule and an economy of equally-sized sectors, i.e.,  =0 5
and set  = .26 All remaining parameters are as in Table 1. For reasons of space, we only present
the results for the case of Edgeworth complementarity, i.e.,  =0 5
Several interesting results emerge (see Figure 5). First of all, for a given average frequency of
price change just above 0.45, endogenous aggregate instability arises when sticky-price heterogeneity
is suﬃciently high. Second, this upper threshold on heterogeneity is strictly decreasing in the aggregate
level of rigidity: the more ﬂexible prices are on average (i.e., the higher is ) the lower is the minimum
26Under this parametrization the only diﬀerence between the two sectors is the degree of price rigidity. Other than
that, they are identical and treated symmetrically by the policy-maker.26
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    E-Stable MSV
Figure 5: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability when varying  and ∆. Goods are
complements  =0 5 and the rule is forward-looking with  =2and  =  =0 5 All remaining
parameters, except for  and  are as in Table 1.
Note: CF = Common Factor representation of a “sunspot” equilibrium and MSV = Minimum State
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Share of Flexible-Price Goods










    E-Stable MSV
Multiple Equilibria
 E-Unstable MSV
Varying the Share of Flexible-Price Goods
Figure 6: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability when varying  and . Goods are
complements  =0 5 and the rule is forward-looking with  =2  All remaining parameters are as in
Table 1.
Note: CF = Common Factor representation of a “sunspot” equilibrium and MSV = Minimum State
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CPI Weight on the Flexible-Price Inflation 








    E-Stable MSV
Multiple Equilibria
 E-Stable CF
Figure 7: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for a forward-looking rule that responds
to the CPI inﬂation. Goods are complements  =0 5 All remaining parameters are as in Table 1.
Note: CF = Common Factor representation of a “sunspot” equilibrium and MSV = Minimum State
Variable representation of a fundamental equilibrium.
degree of heterogeneity (i.e., the lower is ∆) above which aggregate instability arises. Third, the
equilibrium is always unique and E-stable, independently from the degree of heterogeneity, if the
economy is suﬃciently sticky in aggregate terms (low ).27
The Share of Flexible-Price Goods and the Response to CPI Inﬂation Next, we assess
how the results depend on the share of ﬂexible price goods in aggregate consumption .N o t e t h a t ,
in contrast to ,t h es h a r e aﬀects the steady state, including the relative price ¯ . Therefore, it
is not longer possible to focus on the steady state where ¯  =1  A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i xAt h e
(log) CPI inﬂation, which aﬀects the Euler equation (30), is redeﬁned as b  = b 









and  =( 1− )
£
1− +( 1− )
¤−1.
Figure 6 presents the results of varying the share  assuming the goods are complements and the
rule is forward-looking. As  decreases the threshold value for  beyond which aggregate instability
arises, decreases as well. As a result, a rule responding to the expected headline inﬂation b 
+1 =
b 
+1 +( 1− )b 
+1 is more prone to induce stability problems, the smaller is the share of ﬂexible
27This last result holds for a general calibration of the policy rule, and not only for the case considered here, i.e.  =2
and  =  Moreover, we ﬁnd that the determinacy and E-stability areas of Figure 5 shrink (respectively, get larger) if
we increase (respectively, decrease) the weight  That is, the amounts of price ﬂexibility and of sectoral heterogeneity
r e q u i r e dt oi n d u c ea g g r e g a t ei n s t a b i l i t ya r el o w e rw h e nt h ec e n t r a lb a n kd e c i d e st og i v em o r ew e i g h tt oﬂexible price
inﬂation.28
price goods. This ﬁgure also shows that in our model responding to the CPI inﬂation b  i.e.  = 
(which corresponds to the 45 degree line) does not guarantee determinacy and/or E-stability
B u tw h a ta r et h ee ﬀects of responding to CPI inﬂation while varying the share ?F i g u r e7s h o w s
the determinacy and E-stability areas with respect to  and  for complement goods and the policy
rule b  = Eb +1 The Figure shows that the results are to some extent qualitatively similar to
those obtained for a rule responding to expected headline inﬂation (see Figure 2). In particular, when
responding to CPI inﬂation, forward-looking rules are more suceptible to non-learnable fundamental-
drive equilibria, the higher the share . However, note that there is no threshold for this share beyond
which any active rule induces these instability problems, as in the case of responding to the headline
inﬂation.
IV. Robustness and Discussion
In this Section, we discuss the implications of relaxing some of the assumptions of our set-up,
including (i) rules that, besides inﬂation, also respond to output; (ii) diﬀerent timings for money in
the utility function; and (iii) the approach to learning.
Extended Interest Rate Rules The destabilizing consequences of considering a ﬂexible-price
inﬂation measure persist if we augment those rules with an explicit response to aggregate activity. In
particular, for any given coeﬃcient  the Appendix D shows that a positive response to (expected)
output lowers the upper bound on  above which multiple equilibria arise and the fundamental MSV-
REE ceases to be stable under learning. So aggregate instability is more pervasive. This outcome
is in line with the intuition we provided for the analytical results of Propositions 1-3, as well as the
numerical results of Subsection C. As shown, a higher  implies a more negative implicit response to
current sticky-price output, which undermine determinacy and E-stability.
Cash-In-Advance Timing for Money Our model embeds a Cash-When-I’m-Done (CWID) tim-
ing where end-of-period money balances, net of current income and consumption, enter the utility
function. This is the most frequent timing used in the New-Keynesian literature. But how would our
results change if we adopted a Cash in Advance (CIA) timing? that is, if the money that is available
to satisfy consumption is the cash left after visiting the bonds market, but before entering the goods
market?
In the Appendix D, we show that the determinacy and learnability conditions for a forward-looking
rule under the CWID timing are identical to those for a contemporaneous rule under the CIA timing.
This is because the CWID Euler equation under a forward-looking rule is identical to the CIA Euler
Equation with a contemporaneous rule. This isomorphism was ﬁrst pointed out by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) in a one-sector New-Keynesian model and in the context of equilibrium determinacy.
We show that it survives in our two-sector model and, more importantly, that it also applies to the29
learnability conditions.
Therefore, the graphical characterizations of our results in Figure 1 and 2 are also valid for a
contemporaneous rule under the CIA timing: that is, active contemporaneous rules responding to
inﬂation measures that include some ﬂexible-price inﬂation are more prone to induce indeterminacy
and non-learnable fundamental equilibria than rules that exclusively respond to sticky-price inﬂation.28
The Euler Equation Approach versus the Inﬁnite Horizon Learning Approach We have
adopted the “Euler Equation” learning approach of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), as it remains the
most common in the literature on learning and policy rules, including the seminal work of Bullard
and Mitra (2002). By selecting this approach, we have assumed that our “boundedly rational” agents
make decisions based the a simple marginal costs - marginal beneﬁts analysis captured by the ﬁrst
order conditions obtained under rational expectations. In other words, agents were only required to
make one-period-ahead forecasts when making decisions about variables such as consumption, labor
and price setting.
The inﬁnite horizon (IH) approach proposed by Preston (2006) is an alternative approach to
model learning. Preston suggests that when agents have subjective beliefs about the evolution of
aggregate state variables, the decision rules for inﬁnitely-lived optimizing agents should depend on
inﬁnite horizon expectations. Hence, in equilibrium, the Euler equation and the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve should feature expectations over the inﬁnite future sequences of inﬂation, real activity
and the policy rate. As agents do not know others’ beliefs and preferences, they cannot compute the
exact law of motion of aggregate variables and therefore long-horizon forecasts are “irreducible” to a
one-step-ahead prediction.
We infer, however, that our results might still hold under the IH approach provided some plausible
conditions. Our inference is based on Honkapohja et al. (2003). They argue that even under the IH
approach, if each agent actually forms the same forecasts–given that everyone is assumed to rely on
the same econometric model and to have access to the same historical data–then ex-post all agents
behave identically, leading to a symmetric equilibrium. But in a symmetric equilibrium with all agents
(correctly) inferring that the market would clear at any point in time, the IH approach collapses to
the “Euler equation” approach to learning. For more general conditions, there are no equivalence
convergence results between these two approaches. In this regard, it would be interesting to pursue an
extensive IH learning analysis of our model, taking into account that in our multiple-sector economy,
agents would need to form long-horizon expectations not only of future marginal costs and sectoral
inﬂations, but also of future relative prices. This goes beyond the scope of this paper and we are
currently pursuing it as a separate research project.
More generally, once the assumption of rational expectations is dropped, there are other alter-
native ways to model expectation formation. All that is required is that the latter satisfy standard
probability laws at the individual level. For instance, Schorfheide (2005) and Svensson and Williams
28In principle, given the isomorphism, an active backward-looking rule responding to any measure of inﬂation should
deliver a unique and learnable equilibrium in the CIA model.30
(2007) assume Bayesian learning to account for the possibility of, respectively, policy shifts and model
uncertainty. More recently, Adam and Marcet (2010) provide a general discussion about the minimal
set of requirements for subjective expectations to be consistent with individual optimization.
V. Conclusions
We develop a two-sector closed economy model with heterogeneous price stickiness across sectors,
to show that the inﬂation measure included in an interest rate rule is relevant for ensuring equilibrium
determinacy and learnability a la Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We ﬁnd that active rules responding
to inﬂation measures that put some weight on the inﬂation of the sector with low price stickiness are
more suceptible to induce aggregate instability in the economy than rules that respond exclusively
to the inﬂation of the sector with high price stickiness. The sources of instability are related to
the presence of equilibria driven by fundamental shocks that are not learnable, equilibria driven by
self-validating beliefs that are learnable, and equilibria with unbounded ﬂuctuations.
Our results may provide some guidance for the discussion on the appropriate inﬂation measure
for the monetary policy stance in the context of energy price shocks. Should central banks respond
to a headline measure that includes the inﬂation of ﬂexible energy prices? or, instead, should they
react to a core measure that includes mainly the inﬂation of sticky prices? The results of Bodenstein
et al. (2008) advocate for core inﬂation as they ﬁnd that, for fundamental-driven equilibria, rules
responding to a forecast of headline inﬂation induce greater volatility in core inﬂation and the output
gap than rules reacting to a forecast of core. Our results for forward-looking rules support this
policy recommendation. But our explanation is diﬀerent: by responding to an inﬂation measure that
includes ﬂexible-price inﬂation, a rule may induce greater volatility associated with learnable self-
fulﬁlling expectations equilibria of the “sunspot” type, and fundamental-driven equilibria that are not
learnable by the agents.
While we have focused on price rigidity, there are additional sources of sectoral heterogeneity
that one might want to embed into a multi-secto rN e w - K e y n e s i a nm o d e l . I nA i r a u d oa n dZ a n n a
(2010), we allow sectors to diﬀer both because of price stickiness and the impact of policy rates on
marginal costs of production, i.e., the cost channel of Ravenna and Walsh (2006).29 We show that
the inﬂation measure adopted by the central bank is relevant for equilibrium determinacy and E-
stability both under a forward-looking and a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Another issue is
the “durability” of goods. Barsky et al. (2007) show that the aggregate consumption share and the
degree of price rigidity of durable goods have strong implications for the monetary policy transmission
in New-Keynesian models. Whether durability aﬀects our determinacy and E-stability results is an
interesting question to explore.
29In fact, Llosa and Tuesta (2007) have found that in a typical one-sector New Keynesian model, the cost channel can
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the typical equilibrium determinacy and learnability conditions from Bullard and Mitra (2002).31
Appendix
A. The Steady State
Consider the general two-sector model. From the deﬁnitions of the relative price ¯  =
¯ 
¯  and the














From the relative demands of both goods in (4):
¯  =( 1− )
h
¯ 1− +1− 
i 
1− ¯  and ¯  =
1 − 

¯ ¯  (37)
Assume that  =  ≡ 30 Using equation (10) for  = ,  =
−1
   =
−1
  together














 ( − 1)¯ g
  (38)
with ¯ g =
£
¯ 1− +1− 
¤1−
−1  Combining these equations with ¯ 
¯  =
1−





























calibrated values for   and  we can pick  and  such that ¯  =1 
For the strongly dichotomous economy, the procedure is unchanged. With  → +∞ equation










Note that the steady-state value of ¯  aﬀects the log-linearization of the CPI inﬂation. From
(3), we can obtain the following expression for the (log) CPI inﬂation b  = b 
 + b 
 ,w h e r e
 = 
∙





and  =( 1 − )
£
1− +( 1− )
¤−1  This expression reduces to
b  = b 
 +( 1− )b 
 if we let ¯  =1 
B. Lemmata and Proofs of the Propositions
B.1. Lemmata
Lemma 1 Let  ≡  a) If  ≤ 1
 (Edgeworth complements or neutral) then  = 1;b )i f1

(Edgeworth substitutes) then 0 1
30This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the algebra and the notation.32
Proof. The proof is available from the authors upon request.
Lemma 2 Consider the model b  = ΩEb +1 + Πb  where b  is a 2 × 1 vector of non-predetermined
endogenous variables, Ω and Π are conformable matrices, and b  is an exogenous shock following
b  = b −1 + 
  with  ∈ (01) and 
 v (0 2).D e ﬁne the determinant of Ω −  as
(Ω − ) where  is the identity matrix.
a) if (Ω−)  0 and (Ω−)  0 then the MSV representation of an equilibrium b  = A+Nb 
with (02×1, ¯ N) is E-stable.
b) if (Ω − )  0 then the MSV representation of an equilibrium b  = A + Nb  with (02×1, ¯ N) is
E-unstable.
c) Provided that the model displays indeterminacy of order one, if the eigenvalues of Ω are real,
(Ω−)  0 and (Ω−)  0 then the CF representation of a “sunspot” b  = A+Nb +G
with (02×1, ¯ N ¯ G) is E-stable, where  is the “sunspot” following  = −1 + with ||  1 and 
is an arbitrary martingale diﬀerence sequence.
Proof. To prove a), recall (17). Since the model has no lagged terms and  ∈ (01),t h e n
the MSV solution is E-stable, if all the eigenvalues 1 and 2 of A = Ω have real parts less than
one or, equivalently, if all the eigenvalues 1 and 2 of Ω −  have negative real parts. Suﬃcient
conditions for this are (Ω − )  0 and (Ω − )  0 given that the eigenvalues must satisfy
(Ω − )=12 and (Ω − )=1 + 2
For b), it suﬃces to prove that the E-stability conditions are violated. But this is the case if
(Ω − )  0 since this implies that there exists one eigenvalue with a positive real part.
Finally to prove c), recall (18). Given that by assumption the model displays indeterminacy of
order one, that is Ω has only one non-explosive eigenvalue, then pick “” to be that eigenvalue; so
 =  with ||  1 Since  ∈ (01) and  =  with ||  1 then the CF representation is E-stable
if all the eigenvalues 1 and 2 of A = Ω have real parts less than one, or equivalently if all the
eigenvalues 1 and 2 of Ω −  have negative real parts. As in a), this is satisﬁed if (Ω − )  0
and (Ω − )  0
Lemma 3 Let ∗ ≡ 1





















2() Assume  ∈ (01) If 0    2
 then   0  ∗
and the following properties for 2() 3() and 4() hold:







  0 and 2() T 1 if and only if  S ∗










  0 and 3() T 1 if and only
if  S  where  ∈ (0∗)33
c)4():0 4()  2() for any  ∈ (01)
4()










Proof. The proof is available from the authors upon request.
B . 2 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Proof. Using equations (6), (22), (25), (28), and the rule (19)-(20), the equilibrium dynamics around
the non-stochastic steady state are described by the following system:
b  = Υ + ΩEb +1 + Πb  and b  = b −1 +  (40)
where b  =[ b 
 b 










and the form of Π is omitted since it is not required for the analysis. As there are no lagged endogenous
variables (b −1) in the system (40), we can use it for both the equilibrium determinacy and learning
analyses, noting that the matrix  from the representation in (15) satisﬁes  = Ω−1.
To assess equilibrium determinacy it is suﬃcient to characterize the eigenvalues of Ω deﬁned in
(41).31 Let 2() ≡ 1
 The characteristic polynomial associated with Ω is given by P()=2 −















To prove a) use Lemma 1 and   0 to deduce that
1  1()  2() (45)
for any  ∈ (01) when 1
 ≤  or any  ∈ (0∗) when 1
  Next use (42)-(45) to derive that
if 1    1() then P(1)  0 P(−1)  0 and (Ω) ∈ (01) By Azariadis (1993), these are
suﬃcient conditions for the roots of P()=0to be inside of the unit circle Since there are two
non-predetermined variables, b 
 and b 
  then by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) we conclude that there
exists a unique equilibrium.
On the other hand, if   1() then we need to analyze two cases. In the ﬁrst one: 1() 
  2() which together with (43)-(45) imply that P(1)  0 and P(−1)  0 In the second case:
31To apply the results of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for the determinacy analysis, we argued in the main text that
the model needs to be written as in (15). However, recall that  = Ω
−1 provided that the inverse exists Hence the
eigenvalues of  are the reciprocals of the eigenvalues of Ω.34
2()   which in tandem with (43)-(45) imply that P(1)  0 and P(−1)  0 Hence, following
Azariadis (1993), we can infer that under both cases, there is one root of P()=0inside the unit circle,
while the other one is outside of it. Since there are two non-predetermined variables, we conclude that
there exist multiple equilibria. Note that in both cases the roots of P()=0that correspond to the
eigenvalues of Ω are real since P(−1)  0 or P(1)  032
T op r o v eb )o b s e r v et h a tw h e n 1
  we have that 1 by Lemma 1 Hence, for any  ∈ (∗1)
with ∗ = 1
 2()  1()  1 Then for any  ∈ (∗1) assuming   1 implies that   1()
and   2() Use these and (43)-(45) to derive that P(1)  0 and P(−1)  0 These imply that
one root of P()=0is inside the unit circle, whereas the other one is outside of it. As there are two
non-predetermined variables, we conclude that there exist multiple equilibria. Note that once more
the roots of P()=0are real, since P(1)  0
B . 3 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Proof. First use the deﬁnition of Ω in (41) to derive








where  is the identity matrix. Next, note that by Lemma 1 and   0 we know that 1  1() 
2() for any  ∈ (01) when 1
 ≤ or any  ∈ (0∗) when 1
  Hence, if 1()    2() then
by part a2) of Proposition 1 we know that there is indeterminacy (multiple equilibria), which is of order
one. Moreover, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1, the eigenvalues of Ω are real. Furthermore,
by (46) and (47), when 1()    2() and   1 we have that (Ω − )  0 and
(Ω−)  0 Using these we can apply part c) of Lemma 2, to conclude that the CF representation
of stationary “sunspots” is E-stable.
B . 4 . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Proof. First recall (46) and (47) from the proof of Proposition 2.
To prove a) use (46) and (47) to deduce that if 1    2() then (Ω − )  0 and
(Ω − )  0 Then apply part a) of Lemma 2 to conclude that the MSV solution is E-stable. On
the other hand, if   1 and   2() we have that (Ω − )  0 by (47) Then use this and
part b) of Lemma 2 to conclude that the MSV solution is E-unstable.
F o rp a r tb )n o t et h a tw h e n 1
  L e m m a1i m p l i e st h a t1 Therefore for any  ∈ (∗1) with
∗ = 1
 2()  1 Hence   2() since   1 This together with (47) mean that (Ω−)  0
And by part b) of Lemma 2, we conclude that the MSV solution is E-unstable.
32See Azariadis (1993).35
C. Calibration of Price Stickiness
To calibrate the price adjustment cost coeﬃcients  and , we use the micro-evidence for the
U.S. by Bils and Klenow (2004). There are, however, a few caveats:
1. Aggregation bias: Bils and Klenow refer to a sample of 350 categories of goods and services,
while our model is a two-sector two-good economy. Therefore, going from the micro-evidence to
the macro model may induce some aggregation bias. Extending the model to incorporate 350
sectors would indeed help address this bias, but will make the model intractable, without adding
further insights to our discussion on the inﬂation measure. Hence, we keep the two-sector set-up
and calibrate  and  to match some key moments of the Bils and Klenow’s evidence.33
2. Frequency: Bils and Klenow’s statistics are at monthly frequencies, while a quarterly calibration
is preferable to compare our results to those of the standard one-sector New-Keynesian literature.
To obtain a quarterly calibration we elaborate on their Table A1, which reports the monthly
frequency of price changes. We compute the per-quarter average frequency and expected duration
of price changes. As in Carvalho (2006), for each sector  =1 2...350, we set the per month
probability of a price change, , equal to the observed frequency (third column of the table).34






This is obtained by summing up the probability of observing a price change with respect to the
previous quarter in at least one of the months of the current quarter. Then the expected duration
between price spells in sector  is simply  =
¡
¢−1 quarters. Doing this for each sector, we
obtain the (weighted) average quarterly frequency of price change, , and the (weighted) average








where  is the relative weight of sector  in the Bils and Klenow’s sample. The weights are
computed by using the cumulative density in the last column of their table. We obtain that
 =0 52 and  =2 7; that is, on average, ﬁrms change their price at least once with 52%
probability per quarter, while the expected duration is between 2 and 3 quarters, after a price
change.35
33Carvalho (2006) extensively discusses the quantitative consequences of the aggregation bias. Nevertheless, for our
analysis, aggregation has a great advantage. In a two-sector model, the measure of inﬂation targeted by the policy-maker
is completely identiﬁe db yt h es i n g l ew e i g h t ∈ [01] On the other hand, in a more general -sector model, this would
require considering all possible combinations of sectoral weights 1 2...,1 −
−1 
=1
 with  ∈ [01] for all 
0s.
34This is based on the assumption that the probability of price changes is independent across all ﬁrms in the economy.
35An alternative procedure is proposed by Carvalho and Dam (2008). They aggregate the Bils and Klenow’s categories
into eight sectors, with sector  grouping goods and services with an average duration between price spells of at most
 quarters, for  =1 27 The eighth sector includes all remaining categories with a duration above seven quarters.
Each sector is then assigned a duration 
 =  and a weight  corresponding to the sum of the relative weights of its









3. Mapping frequencies into price adjustment costs: Assigning values to the adjustment cost co-
eﬃcients requires two additional steps. First, we compute the quarterly frequencies of price
changes in sector  and sector –denoted, respectively, by  and –to match  =0 52
and  =2 7;t h a ti s , +( 1− ) =0 52 and  +( 1− ) =2 7 where  ≡
¡
¢−1
is sector ’s expected price duration and  is the size of the relatively more ﬂexible sector  In
pursuing this, we set  =0 4, which corresponds to the share of ﬁrms in the sample for which
the expected price duration is equal or smaller than one quarter. Second, from (12), we derive
sector ’s reduced-form augmented Phillips Curve with respect to its marginal cost:
b 
 = Eb 
+1 + c 












 its log-deviation. Under Calvo pricing, we would obtain
an identical curve, but with  ≡ (1−p)(1−p)
p  where p =1− corresponds to the probability
of no price change. We exploit this reduced-form equivalence between the Rotemberg’s and the




p . This procedure gives us  =0 67 and  =7 4 
D. Robustness
In this Appendix, we explore the robustness of our results to i) the addition of an explicit response
to output in the (forward-looking) interest rate rule and ii) a diﬀerent timing of money in the utility
function.
D.1. Responding to Output
Consider ﬁrst the strong dichotomy case of Subsection B. Adding an explicit response to expected
sticky-price output may aggravate the endogenous instability problems induced by a rule. The follow-
ing proposition proves the result for the case of Edgeworth complementarity.36
Proposition 4 Assume goods are complements and the following forward-looking rule:
b  = E
h
b 









 =0 6 This approach gives then a lower average expected duration and a higher average frequency of price
change, i.e. an economy with a lower degree of aggregate price stickiness. A calibration of the adjustment cost coeﬃcients

 and 
 based on this moments would actually reinforce our results on the importance of the measure of inﬂation for
determinacy and E-stability.
36The restriction to the case of complementarity is without loss of generality. Considering only the sticky-price output
i nt h er u l es i m p l i ﬁes the analysis. However, as shown in equation (21), the two consumption goods, and therefore
sectoral outputs, are proportionally related. Consequently, our results would not qualitatively change, if we considered
rules responding to some aggregate measure of output. Details are available from the authors upon request.37
with   1∈ (01) and   0 Let ∗ ≡ 1













a) If 0    2
 then there exists a unique local rational expectations equilibrium and its MSV
representation is learnable (E-stable), when 1    3() for  ∈ (0) where   ∗
b) If  ≥ 2
 then 1) there exist multiple local rational expectations equilibria for any   1; 2) the
CF representation of stationary “sunspot” equilibria is learnable (E-stable) if 1    2() for any
 ∈ (01) and 3) the MSV-REE is non-learnable (E-unstable) when   2() for any  ∈ (01)
Furthermore, 
  0 and
3()
  0
Proof. Combine the rule (48) with (6), (22), (25), (28) and market clearing b 
 = b 
 to obtain the
system (40) where b  =[ b 
 b 


















Observe that Ω collapses to (41), if  =0  The characteristic polynomial for Ω is given by P()=




 ( − 1) +  (1 − )
¤















 [2() − ]
¾
 (51)
where 2() ≡ 1




+2(1+) Given the assumption of Edgeworth
complementarity (1
  ) we have that 1 by Lemma 1.






2() By this deﬁn i t i o n ,w eh a v et h a t2()  4()
if 0    2
 In addition, by Lemma 3 we know that if 0    2
 then   0  ∗ Using this and
the properties of 2() 3() and 4() from this Lemma, we can also infer that if  ∈ (0) then
2()  1 3()  1 4()  1,a n d3()  4(). In turn, this last inequality, 2()  4() and
the assumption 1    3() imply the following ranking for  and the bounds: 1    3() 
4()  2() provided that  ∈ (0) Applying these inequalities to (50) we obtain P(1)  0 and
P(−1)  0 Moreover, it is possible to use (51) and show that as long as 1    4() we have
that (Ω) ∈ (01) Hence for any  ∈ (0) if 0    2
 and 1    3() then P(1)  0
P(−1)  0 and (Ω) ∈ (01) By Azariadis (1993), these are suﬃcient conditions for the roots of
P()=0to be inside of the unit circle Since there are two non-predetermined variables, b 
 and b 
 
then by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium.38
To prove that under a unique equilibrium its MSV representation is E-stable, we use part a) of
Lemma 2. From (49) we can derive that
(Ω − )= − 1+
(1 − ) − 
[2() − ]
and (Ω − )=

£




But as argued before, when  ∈ (0) we have that 3()  2(). Combining this inequality and
the assumption 1    3() together with (52) leads to (Ω − )  0 and (Ω − )  0
Then apply part a) of Lemma 2 to conclude that the MSV representation is E-stable.
To prove b1) consider the following two cases. First, when  ≥ 2
 then by the deﬁnition of 3()
we can infer that 3()  1 And since by assumption   1 we have that if   2() then the
expressions in (50) imply that P(1)  0 and P(−1)  0 On the other hand, if   2() and   1
then from (50) we deduce that that P(1)  0 and P(−1)  0 Hence, under both cases, P()=0has
one root inside the unit circle and the other one outside of it. Since there are two non-predetermined
variables, we conclude that there exist multiple equilibria. Note that the roots are real as either
P(1)  0 or P(−1)  0
Part b2) is proved using (52) to derive that when 1    2(),t h e n(Ω − )  0 and
(Ω − )  0 Using these and the fact that under multiple equilibria the roots are real, we can
apply part c) of Lemma 2 to conclude that the CF representation of stationary “sunspots” is E-stable.
To prove b3) recall that if  ≥ 2
 then 3()  1 For the case 1    2() we have that the
second expression in (52) implies that (Ω − )  0 By part b) of Lemma 2 we conclude that the
MSV solution is E-unstable.
Finally by simple diﬀerentiation we obtain 
  0 and
3()
  0
An active forward-looking rule that responds to expected sticky-price output restricts the deter-
minacy and E-stability areas of Figure 1, in both the  and  dimensions. First, for mild responses
(0    2
), the ’s upper threshold–now denoted by –is smaller than the ∗ identiﬁed in
Propositions 1-3, and strictly decreasing in  Moreover, for any  ∈ (0) the ’s upper bound
3() is always below the threshold 1() identiﬁed in Proposition 1 and indeed decreasing in 
Second, for a response to expected output above 2
 the subset of active rules inducing a determinate
and E-stable equilibrium is completely empty for any  ∈ (01). In this case, the economy displays
pervasive aggregate instability.37
The destabilizing eﬀects of responding to output persist in the more general case studied in Sub-
section C. With both sectors featuring nominal rigidities, we allow the rule to respond to a measure of
aggregate output. That is, b  = Eb 
+1+Eb 
+1 with   1   0 b 
+1 = b 
+1+(1 − ) b 
+1
and  ∈ [01] being some arbitrary weight Using the log-linear versions of the CPI (3), the relative
37Following a similar logic, the beneﬁts from an explicit positive response to current sticky-price output should be










 can be written as   = E 

+1 + E 

+1 +
( − ) 

 . Then the eﬀe c t i v er e s p o n s et oc u r r e n to u t p u tc o u l db ep o s i t i v ef o r   And, as suggested by
Bullard and Mitra (2002), this positive response could make determinacy and E-stability more likely to occur. Results
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
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Forward-Looking Rules that Respond to Output
Figure 8: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for forward-looking rules that also re-
spond to output (  0). Goods are complemetns  =0 5 Parameters other than  and  are set
at baseline values shown in Table 1.
Note: ME = Multiple Equilibria, ES-CF = E-Stable Common Factor representation of a “sunspot”
equilibrium, and MSV = Minimum State Variable representation of a fundamental equilibrium.40


















+Eb +1 +  ( − ) b 
Figure 8 displays the results for the case of  =0and  =  That is, when the rule responds to
stickier price output only, and the output weights are equal to the respective inﬂation weights. By
comparing them with the bottom panel of Figure 2, we can notice that indeed a positive response to
output aggravates aggregate instability problems, by enlarging both the area where the fundamental
REE is not learnable and the area where there exist learnable “sunspot” equilibria.
The quantitative diﬀerence between the simple rule (19) and the extended rule (53) is further
stressed in Table 3. By comparing the latter to Table 1, one can see that a mild response to output,
 =0 5 lowers both the  and the  upper bounds, thus enlarging the indeterminacy/E-instability
areas. For instance, a rule responding to the CPI inﬂation measure,  =0 4,w i t hac o e ﬃcient  =2
induces a unique equilibrium under the simple rule, but learnable “sunspot” equilibria under the
extended rule, for both  =0and  = 
Table 3: Augmented Forward-Looking Rules (=0 5)
Determinacy and E-stability Bounds for Complement Goods
Determinacy Learning
UE ME ES-MSV ES-CF Sunspot EU-MSV
a) = 
1) =2 0 ≤ 038 038 ≤ 1 0 ≤ 045 038 045 045 ≤ 1
2)  =  =0 4 1   188 188   1   224 188   224 224  
b) =0
1) =2 0 ≤ 035 035 ≤ 1 0 ≤ 045 035 045 045 ≤ 1
2)  =  =0 4 1   177 177   1   223 177   223 223  
Note: ∗=0 79 for =  ∗=0 74 for =0  UE = Unique equilibrim. ME = Multiple Equilibria.
ES-MSV = E-stable (learnable) MSV representation of a fundamental equilibrium.
ES-CF Sunspot = E-stable (learnable) CF representation of a “sunspot” equilibrium.
EU-MSV = E-unstable (non-learnable) MSV representation of a fundamental equilibrium.
38Notice that for 
 =  the rule (53) is equivalent to (19)-(20) with the term E +1 added. On the other hand,
for 
 smaller (respectively, larger) than  we would have a stronger (respectively, smaller) response to E 

+1 and a
smaller (respectively, stronger) response to E 

+141
D.2. The Cash-In-Advance Timing
We explore now the consequences of introducing the cash-in-advance (CIA) timing in our model.
To do this, we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) and assume that the money entering the utility






  where  is the CPI deﬁned in (3). We skip
the derivation of the reduced form of the model and instead focus on the main diﬀerence between the
two timings: the Euler equation for aggregate consumption.
Under the CIA timing, the log-linearized Euler Equation is
b  = Eb +1 − −1 (Eb +1 − Eb +1),( 5 4 )
where, in contrast to CWID timing that we adopted in the main text, the nominal interest rate is
scrolled forward one period. For the general two-sector model studied in Subsection C, the equilibrium
dynamics are described equations (32)-(34) together with this new Euler equation, and the interest
rate rule.
It is straightforward to notice that the CIA Euler Equation with a contemporaneous rule is identical
to the CWID Euler equation under a forward-looking rule. Hence, the determinacy and learnability
conditions for a forward-looking rule under the CWID timing must be identical to those for a contem-
poraneous rule under the CIA timing. It is possible to prove this isomorphism for the dichotomous
economy studied in Subsection B. In that case, the sticky-price consumption Euler equation (25) is
replaced by b 
 − Eb 
+1 = −
³
Eb +1 − Eb 
+1
´
, with the only diﬀerence being Eb +1 instead of
b The following proposition states this result.
Proposition 5 Consider the CIA model and the contemporaneous rule b  = b 
 with   1
and  ∈ (01) Then the determinacy and learnability conditions under which this rule induces a
unique equilibrium, multiple equilibria, learnable or non-learnable fundamental equilibria, and learn-
able sunspots are the same as those stated in Propositions 1, 3, and 2 for a forward-looking rule in the
CWID model.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to prove that, for the determinacy and learning analyses, the dynamic
system of the CIA model for a contemporaneous rule is identical to the system of the CWID model for
a forward-looking rule. To prove this, combine (6), (22), (28), the rule b  = b 
, and (54) to obtain
the system (40) where b  =[ b 
 b 
 ]0 Υ =[ 0 0]0 and Ω is deﬁned as in (41). Then the conclusion
follows.42
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